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The Judicial Protection of Individual
Rights in the European Communities
By CONSTANTINOS N. KAKouRIs*
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Some of the features of democracy are that it converts simple in-
terests into rights, that it confers such rights to private persons, indi-
viduals or enterprises, and that it ensures the effective judicial
protection of these rights. The European Economic Community, was
intended to be democratic through the rule of law.
2. The main purpose of this article is to give a general view, first, of
the way in which rights are conferred to private persons within the
Community's legal order and, second, of the way in which individual
rights and interests are judicially protected.
3. A further purpose of this article is to show the influence of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (E.C.J.) on the devel-
opment of the Community system of recognition and protection of
individual rights. In fact, Community law is to a great extent judge-
made law.
H. CREATION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
4. The concern of the E.C.J. for individual rights dates from the
early years of its existence. In the leading case Van Gend en Loos, we
can read the following:
* Judge in the Court of Justice of the European Communities. This article was
presented in March 1993 at the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review's
Eleventh Annual Symposium on International Legal Practice, "The European Community
in Evolution. Toward a Closer Political & Economic Union."
1. In fact, there are three European Communities, established by three separate
Treaties: TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND SmEL COM.M1UNrnY [ECSC
TREATY]; TRATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COM%-IMUNITY [EEC
TREArY]; TR.ETY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN AToMIc ENERGY CoMMmNrn
[EuRATOM TRATY]. Even though most of what is written in this article is common to all
three Communities, reference will be made from now onwards to the EEC.
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Community law.., not only imposes obligations on individuals but
is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of
their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are ex-
pressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations
which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals
as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the
Community.'
5. Individual rights are created by written and uawritten Commu-
nity law. Written Community law consists of the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community (Treaty), which is the primary
law, Regulations, and Directives, which are secondary law.' Unwrit-
ten Community law comprises the general principles of law as well as
the protection of human rights.
A. Written Law
6. The Treaty: Not every provision of the Treaty confers rights upon
individuals, thus having "direct effect;" only provisions which are un-
conditional and sufficiently clear have direct effect. Such provisions
include, for instance, article 30 of the Treaty, which establishes the
freedom of movement of goods, which means that every individual
has the right to export goods to another member state without being
subject to restrictions or having to pay custom duties;' article 48,
which accords to individuals the right to go to any member state to
seek employment;' and article 52, which grants the right to set up a
business in another member state.6
7. If a provision of the Treaty is unconditional and clear enough to
be applied, without the intervention of any further implementation,
that provision is said to have direct effect in the territory of each
member state, (both vertically, concerning relations between private
persons and the State, and horizontally, concerning relations among
private persons).
2. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastigen, 1963
E.C.R. 1, 12.
3. Decisions are not of a regulatory character. They are "individual" acts, addressed
to concrete persons. They are, by definition, of "direct and individual concern" to their
addressees. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 189, 173(2).
4. Id. art. 30.
5. Id. art. 48.
6. Id. art. 52.
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8. Regulations: According to article 189 of the Treaty, regulations
have, by definition, direct effect (both vertical and horizontal), and
they are directly applicable in the territory of the member states.7
9. Directives: According to article 189, "Directives shall bind any
Member State to which they are addressed, as to the result to be
achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies discretion to form and
means." 8 According to this article, a directive can create rights in
favor of private persons or impose obligations on them only after it
has been transferred, by implementing measures, into the internal leg-
islation of a member state. The case law of the E.CJ. has, however,
established, through interpretation, the rules below.
10. Where a member state has failed to implement a directive in its
internal legal order within the time limit laid down, that member state
may not invoke against private persons its own failure to fulfill its
obligation, and refuse on that ground to such persons the rights which
the provisions of a directive grant them (nemo auditur suam turpi-
tudinem allegans, principle of estoppel). Thus, the case law of the
E.CJ. has established that those provisions of directives which, being
unconditional and sufficiently clear, do not need to be implemented
and completed by legislative measures taken by a member state, but
they create rights in favor of private persons against this member
state. These rights can also be enforced against all public bodies, in-
cluding decentralized authorities, such as municipalities (vertical
effect) .9
11. It should be noted that vertical direct effect is "one way," mean-
ing that private persons can invoke a directive against a member state
and its bodies, but a member state cannot invoke against private per-
sons obligations resulting from a Directive which the member state
has failed to transfer into national legislation."0
12. Furthermore, where a directive has not yet been transferred,
rights can be created not only by.a directive's unconditional and clear
provision, but also, in an indirect, reflective way, by provisions which
are not unconditional. That is because the E.C.J. has established that
national laws must always be interpreted, as far as possible, in accord-
7. Id. art. 189, para. 2.
8. Id. art. 189, para. 3.
9. See e.g. Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo v. Comune di Milano, 1989 E.C.R. 1839.
10. Case 80/86, Criminal Proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV, 1987 E.C.R.
3969, 3985.
1993]
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ance with the spirit of the directives."1 So, it may happen that rights
based on an unconditional and clear national provision acquire the
content dictated by a directive whenever the provision is construed in
the light of that directive. It should be mentioned that, in such a case,
a non-transferred directive may have not only vertical, but horizontal
effect, both before and after the expiry of the time limit laid down for
its implementation. 2
13. Apart from that, according to the E.C.J., directives have no direct
horizontal effect, meaning they do not create rights and obligations
among private persons unless they are transferred into the internal
legal order of the member state concerned.
B. Unwritten Law
14. Alongside written Community law stands unwritten Community
law, which also creates individual rights.
15. General principles of law: Article 164 of the Treaty requires the
E.C.J. to seek the "law" which exists above the Treaty and to ensure
that that law is observed. 3 Thus, in Merlini v. High Authority of the
European Coal and Steel Community, the E.C.J. stated that "the fact
that such a rule is not mentioned in written law is not sufficient proof
that it does not exist.' 4
16. In its case law, the E.C.J. has recognized the existence of several
general principles of law. The reasoning for such an existence lies,
inter alia, in the assumption that these principles are "generally ac-
cepted in every legal order," or that they result from the "require-
ments of a sound Justice or Good Administration," 15 or that they are
drawn from a provision of the Treaty.'6 At times, these general princi-
ples are simply qualified as "fundamental" without any further
explanation.17
11. Grainne de Burca, Giving Effect to European Community Directives, 55 MoD. L.
Rnv. 215, 217 (1992); see also Christopher Docksey & Barry Fitzpatrick, The Duty of Na.
tional Courts to Interpret Provisions of National Law in Accordance with Community Law,
20 INDus. L. J. 113 (1991).
12. See Deirdre Curtin, Directives: The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 709, 719 (1990).
13. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 164.
14. Case 108/63, Merlini v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, 1965 E.C.R. 1, 10.
15. See, e.g., case 32/62, Alvis, 1963 E.C.R. 101, 114 (French edition).
16. For example, the terms "justified" or "necessary" imply the notion of proportion-
ality; the provision of the 'reaty is taken to be the expression of a general principle of law.
17. See, e.g., case 1/71, Frilli, 1972 E.C.R. 457, 466.
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17. The general principles of law have not been exhaustively listed by
the E.C.J. They are ascertained on a case-by-case basis. Such general
principles include the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expecta-
tion, vested rights, equality, proportionality, the right to be heard, non
bis in idem, nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege, the right to a fair
trial, and the right of defense.
18. The general principles of law may not only confer rights; they
may also have an impact on the content and scope of a right conferred
by a provision of written Community law or by another general princi-
ple of law. 8
19. Human Rights: The Treaty, which is regarded as the "Constitu-
tion" of the Community,' 9 does not expressly provide for the protec-
tion of human rights, nor does it draw up a list of such rights. This
gap, however, exists only in written law and is made up for by unwrit-
ten law: The E.C.J., after a certain period of hesitation, 0 has through
its case law ascertained the existence and protection of human rights.
20. The E.C.J. declared that the acts of Community institutions,
either of general application or addressed to specific persons, must
comply with human rights. In four of its leading cases, the E.CJ.
stated: "The respect of fundamental rights forms an integral part of
the general principles of law protected by the E.CJ. The protection of
such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States, must be ensured within the framework of the
structure and objectives of the Community."'" It should be noted that
the constitutional traditions and, in later judgments, the national con-
stitutions themselves to which the E.C.J. referred to above, are taken
in the broader sense of a source of inspiration and not in the strict
sense of being a legal basis for human rights.
21. Several judgments have followed, thus creating a significant list of
human rights, including the rights to property, free business activity,
18. See generally ANTHONY ARNu.L, THE GENERAL PmNCIPLES OF EEC LAw AN
THE INDMvUAL (1990).
19. Case 294/83, "Les Verts" v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339.
20. Case 1158, Stork v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community,
1959 E.C.R. 17; Joined Cases 36,37,38, and 40/59, Geitling v. High Authority of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, 1960 E.C.R. 423; Case 40/64, Sgarlata v. Commission,
1965 E.C.R. 215.
21. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur
Getreide, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1134; Case 29/69, Stauder v. Urn, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 425; Case
4173, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 507; Case 44179, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-
Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3744-45.
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fair and public hearing, privacy, family life, human dignity, religious
convictions, and the right to strike.22
22. The Maastricht Treaty expressly recognizes fundamental rights in
language taken from E.C.J. case law.' The Treaty also confers to
member states' nationals European "citizenship."24 The privileges of
this European citizenship include, in addition to the rights already
conferred to individuals by the Treaty, a wider freedom of move-
ment, the right to vote and to be a candidate in elections for munici-
pal authorities,26 the right to petition the European Parliament, 7
which already exists in practice,28 and the right to address complaints
to the Ombudsman.29
MI. JUDICIAL PROTECTION
A. The Community Legal Order
23. After the foregoing description on the methods of creating indi-
vidual rights, we may now come to the description of the system of
judicial protection of individual rights and interests laid out in the
Community legal order.
24. A breach of a rule of Community law may affect private persons'
interests or private persons' rights if the infringed rule confers such
rights. In a state governed by the rule of law, judicial protection of
individuals in case of breach of law must be ensured; and the Commu-
nity is governed by the rule of law.
Breach of Community law can result from an action either of pri-
vate persons, natural or legal, or of national authorities or of the Com-
munity itself. It should be noted, however, that Community law is
mainly public law. It governs relations between private persons and
public authorities and only marginally governs relations between pri-
vate persons. So, against a private person's right based on Commu-
nity law there is rarely a corresponding private person's obligation
towards another private person; these rights are governed, to a great
22. On the judicial protection of the human rights of non-EC nationals, see Joseph
H.H. Weiler, Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of Non-EC
Nationals - A Critique, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 65 (1992).
23. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,1992, tit.I, art. F, § 2,31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
Maastricht Teaty].
24. Id. art. 8.
25. Id. art. 8a.
26. Id. art. 8b.
27. Id. art. 8d.
28. Cf. Claude Blumann, L'Europe des Citoyens, 346 MARCH0 COM. 283, 290 (1991).
29. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 23, art. 8d.
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extent, by public law; consequently, they are subject to infringement
only by a competent public authority, Community authority or au-
thority of a member state.
25. Before dealing with the judicial protection of individual rights
and interests in the Community legal order, we must first briefly de-
scribe the structure of the Community's legal order, which is a quasi-
federal one.
26. Why federal? If we look at things from a purely juridical point of
view, we observe a sharing of powers between the "center," the Com-
munity, the federal point, and the member states. Some matters fall
within the powers of the Community and are thus governed by the
Community; others have remained in the hands of member states.
From a purely juridical standpoint, this corresponds to the structure of
every federal state.
27. Why quasi? The political content of this sharing of powers does
not correspond to the pattern of power allocation known to date in
the federal states which have emerged in history or which exist at
present. Traditionally, in federal states, what falls within the power of
the federal center is, apart from the so called "competence of compe-
tence," competence to define the fields of their competence, mainly
the foreign affairs and defense policies. In the Community, the re-
verse happens: Foreign affairs and defense still remain in the hands of
member states, while other matters, mainly economic, have become
federal; the member states have also kept the competence of
competence.
28. The political content of the Community is beyond the scope of
the description which follows. It suffices here to keep in mind that the
legal structure of the Community is federal. Consequently, both fed-
eral legislation and national legislation exist at the same time. It
should be noted, however, that despite the fact that both federal and
national legislation exist at the same time, the two are distinct, and the
borderline between them is neither rigid nor always clear. In fact,
there is a relationship and interaction between the federal legal order
and the national legal orders. Further on, I will refer to some points
on this relationship.
29. The inter-relationship of the two legal orders exists not only at
the legislative level, but also at the executive level, between Commu-
nity authorities and national authorities. Community authorities in
the broader sense can be either central or regional. Only the central
ones are the Community's own authorities. The Community does not
possess its own regional authorities, but uses the authorities of the
1993]
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member states. These national authorities become Community au-
thorities whenever they are called upon to apply Community law
("d~doublement fonctionnel" according to the terminology used by
Scelle in international law).30
30. Community law is implemented through two separate actions: di-
rect administration and indirect administration. It is only the central
Community authorities that exercise direct administration. These are
the Community institutions. Their acts are mainly of general applica-
tion, regulatory acts: regulations and directives. Few of the acts
adopted by the central Community authorities are of individual char-
acter or addressed to concrete persons.
In contrast, acts issued by national authorities acting as Commu-
nity bodies applying Community law are mainly individual acts and
only rarely acts of a regulatory character. So, Community law is ap-
plied partly by the Community's own institutions-Direct Administra-
tion-and partly by regional authorities of the Community, namely
the member states and their authorities-Indirect Administration.
31. Accordingly, the judicial system of the Community is two-tiered:
the central judicial institution, the E.C.J., to which the Court of First
Instance, has been attached,31 and the regional courts and tribunals.
The Community is not endowed with its own regional courts and
tribunals, but has recourse to the national courts and tribunals of the
member states, which become Community courts and tribunals when-
ever they rule upon cases governed by Community law.
B. Judicial Position of Private Persons
32. Let us now examine the judicial and procedural position of pri-
vate natural or legal persons in the Community legal order as de-
scribed above.32 Private persons' rights or interests may be infringed:
First, by illegal action or inaction of Community institutions; second,
by action or inaction of a member state; third, by action or inaction of
national authorities acting as Community authorities, meaning when
applying Community law; and fourth, by private persons. The reme-
30. See Constantinos N. Kakouris, La relation de l'ordre juridique communautaire avec
les ordres juridiques des Etats membres, in LIBER AMICoRUM PIERRE PESCATORE, Du
DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROrr DE L'INTkORATION 319 (1987).
31. The decisions of the Court of First Instance are subject to appeal to the Court of
Justice, on points of law only. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 168.
32. See generally HENRY G. SCHEMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PRO-
TECTION IN TiE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (5th ed. 1992); see also S. Koukouli-Spilioto-
poulou, Questions Relating to the Influence of Community Law on the Judicial Protection,
40 NOMIKO VIMA 825 (1993) (in Greek).
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dies available to private persons are different in each one of these four
cases.
1. Acts of Community Institutions
33. Private persons may either bring an action for annulment, invoke
the plea, exceptio, of illegality or bring an action for damages against
acts of Community institutions according to the following distinctions.
34. Individual acts (Decisions): Article 173 of the Treaty provides
that "any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, in-
stitute proceedings against a d6cision addressed to that person or
against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a
decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual con-
cern to the former." 33 The grounds for annulment upon which the
person can rely include "lack of competence, infringement of an es-
sential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any
rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers."3M The
time limit for lodging an application for annulment is two months fol-
lowing the publication or notification or knowledge by the plaintiff of
the measure3 5
The E.C.J. has adopted a broad interpretation of the criterion of
"direct and individual concern," but this interpretation is not so broad
as to admit actions brought by private persons against regulatory acts
of Community institutions. The E.C.J. evidently has considered that
such an admission would have been a bold form of "activism" and an
interpretation contra legem. Some writers, however, have criticized
this attitude of self-restraint.36
35. According to article 175 of the Treaty, an individual also has the
right to bring proceedings against a Community institution for its fail-
ure to address to him an individual act, provided that he has previ-
ously called upon the Community institution to perform such an act
and provided that the institution has not responded within a period of
two months.37
33. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 173, para. 2. About groups, see V. Christianos, La
recevabilitM des actions de groupe devant la Cour de Justice des Communauts Europeennes,
in Group Actions and Consumer Protection, STORY scm-NA, 1992, at 218.
34. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 173.
35. Id.
36. See eg. Hjalte Rasmussen, Why is Article 173 interpreted against private plaintiffs?,
4 Eut. L. Rnv. 112,122-27 (1980). Rasmussen's arguments are, however, de legeferenda.
See also Christopher Harding, The Review of EEC Regulations and Decisions, 19 Co.ooN
MKr. L. REv. 311 (1982).
37. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 175.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
36. A private person has no direct access to the E.C.J. in order to
institute proceedings for annulment against Community Institutions'
acts of general application, regulations, and directives. The private
person is not, however, deprived of all judicial protection. If an indi-
vidual act is addressed to him by a Community institution, in applica-
tion or on the basis of a regulation, he can bring an action for
annulment against that individual act, pleading that the act was based
on an illegal and void regulation. Where a regulation is implemented
through acts of a member state's authorities, an individual has the
remedies provided for by national law.38
37. Judicial protection implies the right to apply for interim meas-
ures, since there are cases where, without such interim measures, the
plaintiff will be deprived of the practical benefits of the final judg-
ment, even if that final judgment is in the plaintiff's favor.
Articles 185 and 186 of the Treaty provide for such interim meas-
ures.39 According to these articles, the granting of interim measures is
subject to the following conditions: a) that main proceedings for the
protection of these rights have also been instituted and are neither
manifestly inadmissible nor manifestly unfounded; and b) that the ap-
plicant risks suffering serious and irreparable loss, which must be
weighed against the corresponding risk incurred by the defendant.40
38. In addition to the action for annulment and the plea of illegality,
the Treaty also provides, in favor of private persons who have suffered
damages because of an unlawful action by the Community: "In the
case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance
with the general principles common to the laws of the member states,
make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in
the performance of their duties."'" In interpreting this provision, the
E.C.J. has been confronted with the specific problem of the Commu-
nity's liability arising out of legislative acts such as regulations. In
most member states, there is no state liability for damages resulting
from statutory legislation, unless the statutory law itself expressly pro-
vides for such a remedy. The E.C.J. has interpreted the Treaty to ac-
cord the right to claim damages when a regulation, in substance an act
38. See infra Part 3.
39. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 185-186.
40. Blanca Pastor & Eric Van Ginderachter, La Procedure en Refere, REv. TRIM. DR.
EtR. 561, 586-87 (1989).
41. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 215, para. 2.
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of a legislative nature, constitutes a "sufficiently serious breach of a
superior rule of law for the protection of the individuals." 42
2. Acts of Member States
39. Where a member state fails to fulfill its obligation to legislate in
compliance with a directive within the time limit specified in the direc-
tive, a private person has no judicial remedy against that omission to
compel the state to legislate accordingly. What he can do is turn to
the Commission and prompt it to institute proceedings against that
member state for failing to fulfil its obligations. The private person,
however, has no means to force the Commission to institute proceed-
ings. The private person also enjoys, under certain conditions, the ju-
dicial remedy of claiming damages, if he has suffered loss due to such
a failure of the member state. In the recent case of Francovich,43 the
E.CJ. said that the state whose failure to comply with a Directive has
been recognized will be held liable if (1) the directive is of a nature to
confer rights to private persons, (2) the content of these rights can be
defined solely on the basis of the provisions of the directive, and (3)
there is a link of causality between the failure of the state to comply
and the damage brought about.44
3. Acts of National Authorities
40. Most of the acts which can affect rights or interests of private
persons are issued by the Community's regional authorities, i.e. the
national authorities; and most of the legal disputes governed by Com-
munity law arise within the legal framework of a member state.
41. Where a regulation, directive, or decision is implemented by na-
tional authorities through the adoption of regulatory or individual
acts, a private person enjoys the iemedies provided for by the national
legal order. Such remedies include, for example, annulment of an act
on the grounds that it is based on a regulation, directive, or decision
which is illegal and void.45 In such a case, the national court or tribu-
42. Joined cases 64 and 113/76, 167 and 239/78, 27, 28 and 45/79, Dumortier, 1979
E.C.R. 3091, 3114.
43. Joined cases C-6 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 5357.
44. A. Barav, Damages Against the State for Failure to Implement EC Directives, NEw
L. J. 1584 (1991); Louis Dubouis, La responsabiliti de l'Etat pour les dommages causes ax
particuliers par la violation du droit communautaire, 8 R. FR. D. Anmm. 1, 3 (1992).
45. On the issue of whether the plea of illegality can be raised by a private person that
was entitled to bring an action for annulment before the E.C.J., but did not bring such an
action in time, see Gerhard Bebr, The Reinforcement of the Constitutional Review of Com-
munity Acts under Article 177 EEC Treaty, 25 COMMON MKcT. L Rnv. 667, 684-91 (1988).
1993]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
nal will refer the matter to the E.C.J. for a preliminary ruling on the
question of the validity of the regulation, directive, or decision.46
42. The plea of illegality against a regulation, directive, or decision,
raised by a private person, who is a party in national proceedings,
may, according to the case law of the E.C.J., be rejected by the na-
tional court or tribunal, but it cannot be upheld. Thus, if the national
court or tribunal doubts the validity of a regulation, directive, or deci-
sion, it must refer a preliminary question to the E.C.J. The parties
involved in national proceedings can then submit their observations
on the question referred before the E.C.J.
4. Legal Disputes Between Private Persons
43. In the territory of a member state, it may happen that an individ-
ual right based on a rule of Community law is affected by the behavior
of a private person; a dispute may thus be brought before national
courts or tribunals. In such cases, the remedies available to private
persons are those provided by national legislation. Although the posi-
tion of private persons may vary from one member state to another,
judicial protection is basically ensured.
C. Cooperation Between the E.CJ. and National Courts
44. Where national courts or tribunals are called upon to apply Com-
munity law, thus becoming Community courts and tribunals, questions
may arise concerning the cooperation between national courts or
tribunals and the E.C.J., as well as concerning the relation between
Community law and national law.47 The following brief observations
concern these points.
45. Cooperation is necessary in order to ensure uniformity in inter-
preting and applying Community law throughout the territory of the
Community. To this end, article 177 of the Treaty has established the
system of preliminary rulings, which are given by the E.C.J. in answer-
ing questions referred to it by national courts or tribunals.48
46. Case 314/85, Foto Frost v. Hauptzollamt Ltlbeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, 4230.
47. See generally A. Barav, La plenitude de competence du juge national en sa qualite
de juge communautaire, in MtLAxms BOULOUIS I et seq. (1991).
48. Article 177 provides:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary decision con-
cerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of
acts of the institutions of the Community; and (c) the interpretation of the stat-
utes of any bodies set up by an act of the Council, where such statutes so provide.
Where any such question is raised before a court or tribunal of one of the
Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment de-
[Vol. 16
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46. This system has proved to be very successful; nearly half of the
judgments of the E.C.J. are preliminary rulings. Through the ques-
tions referred by national courts and tribunals and the answers given
by the E.CJ., there has developed a dialogue that mutually enriches
the views of both the central E.C.J. and the regional national courts
and tribunals.
D. The Relation Between Community Law and National Law
47. As far as the relation between Community law and national law is
concerned, the following remarks should be made.
48. The Community "uses" national courts and tribunals as organized
by national legislation as Community courts and tribunals ("institu-
tional and procedural autonomy"). Community law contains no rules
as to the sharing of jurisdiction among national courts and tribunals,
either as to the kind of judicial remedies available, 49 or as to the right
of appeal or the rules of procedure to be applied. In all these matters,
the Community "uses" national law as it stands. However, this is true
only in principle because there are cases in which national law is "al-
tered" in order to satisfy the requirements of Community law.
49. The institutional and procedural autonomy of national courts and
tribunals is limited to questions of competence and procedure. The
substance of the litigation is governed by Community law, which is
thus the law to be applied by the national judge.
50. Doubts and disputed points often arise concerning the relation-
ship between Community law and national law. This relationship can
be explained by the following basic rules. Within the field of the
pends on a preliminary decision on this question, request the Court of Justice to
give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a domestic court
or tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under municipal law, such court
or tribunal refer the matter to the Court of Justice.
EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 177.
49. Case 158180, Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH and Rewe-Markt Steffen v.
Hauptzollamt Kiel, 1981 E.C.R. 1805, 1807 [hereinafter Croisi~res de beurre] ("Although
the EEC Treaty has made it possible in a number of instances for private persons to bring a
direct action, where appropriate, before the Court of Justice, it was not intended to create
new remedies in the national courts to ensure the observance of Community law other
than those already laid down by national law."); Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and
Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer ftlr das Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989, 1997
("lt is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having
jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended
to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from the direct effect of Commu-
nity law, it being understood that such conditions cannot be less favorable than those relat-
ing to similar actions of a domestic nature.").
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Community's jurisdiction, Community law is directly applicable and
takes precedence over any provision of national law. This is the so-
called doctrine of supremacy or primacy of Community law.
Matters falling within the member states' jurisdiction are gov-
erned by national law, albeit not to an unlimited extent. By virtue of
the principle of Community cooperation and solidarity laid down in
article 5 of the Treaty,50 member states are bound to legislate, even in
these matters, in such a way as not to hinder the application of Com-
munity law, unless that proves to be absolutely necessary. Moreover,
under the principle of proportionality, any such legislation must not
hinder Community law any more than absolutely necessary.
51. Consequently, a national judge, when acting as a Community
judge, must lay aside and disregard any national provision which is
incompatible with Community law. However, before doing so, he
must, under E.C.J. case law, exhaust every possibility of interpreting
the national provision in such a way as not to conflict with the require-
ments of Community law.5 1
52. The principle of procedural autonomy is subject to certain limita-
tions because the national rules of procedure are applied as rules com-
plementary to Community law5 Therefore, whenever the application
of a rule results in a failure to protect rights granted by Community
law to the individual concerned, that rule must, in accordance with
E.C.J. of the case law, be set aside.
53. For example, the deadline laid down for lodging an appeal must
be reasonable. It cannot be too short. 3 Another example concerns
the time limit or the time of prescription concerning the exercise of a
right that a person derives from the direct effect of a directive, which a
member state has failed to implement in its internal legal order5 4
54. This time of prescription does not commence from the moment
when that person could have been able to bring an action in order to
50. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 5.
51. See e.g. Case 157/86, Mary Murphy et al. v. Bord Telecom Eireann, 1988 E.C.R.
673, 690. See also Case 80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegan, 1987 E.C.R. 3986; Docksey & Fitz-
patrick, supra note 11, at 113.
52. They are applied "in the absence of any relevant Community rules." See Case 45/
76, Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siegerwassen, 1976 E.C.R. 2043, 2053. See also F.
Gr6visse & J.B. Bonichot, Les incidences du droit communautaire sur l'organisatlion et
I'exercice de la fonction juridictionnelle dans les Etats membres, in MgLANoES supra note
47, at 298 et seq.
53. See e.g., Rewe-Zentralfinanz, supra note 49, at 1998; Comet, supra note 52, at 2053;
Case C-5/89, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1990 E.C.R. 3437, 3458.
54. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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see his right ascertained, which is the general rule, but from the mo-
ment when the directive will be formally incorporated in the national
legal system. The case law of the E.CJ. aims, here again, at the pro-
tection of individual rights: So long as a directive has not been prop-
erly transposed into national law, individuals are unable to ascertain
the full extent of their rights. That state of uncertainty for individuals
subsists even after the Court has delivered a judgment finding that the
member state in question has not fulfilled its obligations under the
directive.55
55. Similarly, in Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SPA San
Giorgio, the E.C.J. considered an action for reimbursement of duties
unduly paid as being contrary to Community law. 6 The applicable
national law imposed on the party involved the burden to prove, only
by written evidence, that he had not passed on to his purchasers the
customs duties he had paid. The E.C.J. held that that law resulted in
making the legal pursuit of rights founded upon Community law prac-
tically impossible; therefore, that law should not be applied by a na-
tional judge, even if the law is applicable in relationships between
nationals governed by national law.57 In Johnson v. Chief Constable
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the E.C.J. also held that a national
judge must disregard a rule of national law attributing a binding force
of evidence to a public instrument, hence limiting the power of the
national judge to appraise evidence freely.58
56. In Union of Commercial and Clerical Employees, Denmark v.
Danfoss, the E.C.J. created an exception to the rule that it is the plain-
tiff who bears the burden of proof.59 It often happens that, where the
plaintiff is a worker and the defendant is his employer, all information
needed to shed light on the case is in the hands of the employer, the
worker may have at his disposal few elements of proof, if any. In such
a case, the E.C.J. accepts that, where the plaintiff worker has pro-
duced sufficient elements leading to the presumption that the em-
ployer has violated a rule of Community law, such as the rule of equal
55. Case 208/90 Emmott v. Minister for Social Welfare and the Attorney General, 3
C.M.L.R. 894 (1991).
56. Case 199/82, Administrazione delle Fmanze dello Stato v. SPA San Giorgio, 1983
E.C.R. 3575.
57. Id. at 3614. See also Cases 331,376 and 378/85, Les Fils de Jules Bianco SA and J.
Girard Fils SA v. Directeur general des douanes et droits indirects, 1988 E.C.R. 1099,1118.
58. Case 222/84, Johnson v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986
E.C.R. 1651, 1682.
59. Case 109/88, Union of Commercial and Clerical Employees, Denmark v. Danfoss,
1989 E.C.Rt 3199, 3226.
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treatment between men and women, the employer bears the burden
of proving that he has not discriminated against women, or vice versa.
57. In the same line is the case law concerning interim measures. In-
deed a necessary complement available before national courts for an
effective protection of individual rights founded upon Community law
is the possibility of granting injunctive relief through the ordering of
interim measures, especially in cases where proceedings before a na-
tional court are suspended following a reference to the E.C.J. for a
preliminary ruling. The following two judgments are significant in this
respect.
58. Under British law, a judicial'remedy for seeking interim measure
was provided. However, according to a fundamental principle of con-
stitutional force, British law does not allow a judge to suspend the
application of an act of Parliament. In Queen v. Secretary of State for
Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd. et al,60 the E.C.J. provided that, if
the only ground which impedes a national court from granting an in-
terim measure is the existence of a rule of national law, the national
court must set that rule aside.61
59. By contrast, in the Zuckerfabrik cases, the national law provided
no interim measures. 62 In these cases, the validity of a Community
regulation constituting the basis for an individual act of application
was challenged before the national court. The E.C.J. held that a na-
tional judge was vested directly by Community law with the power to
grant interim measures under the following conditions: (a) that the
national court has serious doubts about the validity of the regulation;
(b) that it makes a reference to the E.C.J. for a preliminary ruling; (c)
that the suspension of the application of the regulation will not de-
prive the regulation of any practical usefulness; and (d) that a risk of
serious and irreparable loss exists. The plaintiff may be asked to lay
down a security.
60. All the above examples show that national law is often altered or
set aside to make national legislative schemes consistent with the sub-
stantive requirements of Community law.
60. Case C-213/89, Queen v. Secretary of State for aTansport, ex parte: Factortame
Ltd. et al, 1990 E.C.R. 2433, 2474.
61. Constantinos N. Kakouris, On the Judgment 213/89 Factortame 1 (1990), Minutes of
the Second Congress of Administrative Courts, Athens, 1990, NAT. PRnss, 1991, at 109 et
seq. (in Greek).
62. Cases 143/88 & 92/89, Zuckerfabrik Suderdithmarschen AG v. Hauptzollamt
Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest Gmbh v. Hauptzollamt Paderborn, 1991 E.C.R. 415.
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IV. CONCLUSION
61. The above description shows that the judicial protection of indi-
vidual rights in the Community is complete; it is guaranteed by the
case law built up by the E.C.J. which manages, in a remarkable way,
to fill in the gaps left by written Community law.

